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Case Notes
LITZ v. MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENT:
MARYLAND’S DECISION THAT INACTION CAN SUPPORT AN
INVERSE CONDEMNATION CLAIM
KERRI MORRISON
In Litz v. Maryland Department of the Environment,1 the Court of Appeals of Maryland recognized a new basis for inverse condemnation
claims.2 The case arose following the contamination of the petitioner’s
lake, allegedly due to the failure of local septic systems.3 The Court of Appeals held that a governmental entity’s inaction, when that governmental
entity had an affirmative duty to act, can serve as a basis for an inverse condemnation claim.4 This holding is somewhat controversial because only a
few states have recognized that inaction can form the basis of an inverse
condemnation claim.5 In contrast, some states have expressly held that an
inverse condemnation claim requires government action.6 The holding of
the Court of Appeals of Maryland, however, is justified as it: (1) conforms
with the reasoning used by some courts in other jurisdictions; (2) supports
the policy objectives underlying takings jurisprudence; and (3) can be limited in the future to avoid potentially harmful consequences, such as increasing litigation against government entities or increasing government liability for failures to act.7

© 2017 Kerri Morrison.

J.D. Candidate, 2018, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law. The author thanks her editors, Joshua Carback, Hannah Cole-Chu, Michael Collins, Samriti Madan, and
Dave Maher, and Professor Michael Pappas for their assistance and their thoughtful comments
during the writing process.
1. 446 Md. 254, 131 A.3d 923 (2016) [hereinafter “Litz II”].
2. Id. at 267, 131 A.3d at 931.
3. Id. at 257, 131 A.3d at 925.
4. Id. at 267, 131 A.3d at 931.
5. See infra Part II.B (discussing cases holding that inaction can serve as the basis for inverse condemnation claims).
6. See infra Part II.B (discussing cases holding inaction cannot serve as the sole basis for
inverse condemnation claims).
7. See infra Part IV (analyzing the how the court’s decision conforms with decisions made
in other jurisdictions and with takings jurisprudence broadly and discussing how the court may
limit the holding in the future).
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I. THE CASE
The Litz case arose out of the contamination of a privately owned lake
due to the lack of an adequate sewage system in a Maryland town.8 The petitioner alleged that because of the contamination, she could no longer operate her property as a campground.9 Following the foreclosure of her property, she sued the town of Goldsboro, the state of Maryland, and several
state agencies alleging, among other claims, an inverse condemnation of the
property.10 The court analyzed whether government inaction can serve as
the basis of an inverse condemnation claim.11
A. The Contamination of Lake Bonnie
The property at issue in Litz was a 140-acre property that was purchased by the parents of petitioner Gail Litz in 1948 and located in
Goldsboro, a small town in Caroline County, Maryland.12 The Litzes transformed a portion of the property into a lake, Lake Bonnie, in the 1950s for
irrigation purposes and started running a recreational business on the property, including activities such as boating, camping, fishing, and swimming.13 In 2001, petitioner Gail Litz inherited this property and became the
owner of the recreational business.14
The contamination of Lake Bonnie was caused by two streams that fed
into the lake.15 Those streams received water from groundwater sources,
from surface water sources, and from three drainage collection systems.16
The residents of Goldsboro relied on wells and septic systems because the
town did not have public water or sewer systems.17 From as early as the
1970s, however, those septic systems began to fail and contaminated the
drainage collection system.18 Contamination of the drainage collection system in turn contaminated the streams that the drainage system discharged
into and, ultimately, contaminated Lake Bonnie.19 In 1985, the Caroline
County Health Department studied the issue and concluded that between

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Litz II, 446 Md. at 257, 131 A.3d at 925.
Id. at 257–58, 131 A.3d at 925.
Id.
Id. at 257, 267, 131 A.3d at 925, 931.
Id. at 258, 131 A.3d at 925.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 259, 131 A.3d at 925.
Id., 131 A.3d at 926.
Id., 131 A.3d at 925–26.
Id.
Id., 131 A.3d at 926.
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seventy and eighty percent of the town had sewage pits, raw sewage, waste
water, or wells less than one hundred feet from a source of contamination.20
The failure of the drainage system and the resulting contamination of
Lake Bonnie continued unabated, despite the County’s findings.21 In 1995,
the Caroline County Health Department stated that “use of the stormwater
management system in the Town as a sewage system has gotten to crisis
proportions,” and the Maryland Department of the Environment (“MDE”)
concluded that the situation impacted Lake Bonnie’s water quality.22 On
August 8, 1996, MDE and Goldsboro’s mayor at the time, William Bartin,
signed an administrative consent order.23 The order required Goldsboro to
identify sources of contamination, complete a study on the construction of a
sewage system, and submit plans for construction of a sewage system to
MDE.24 Goldsboro did not fulfill the requirements of the consent order, but
MDE also failed to penalize the town as the order required.25 Shortly before the consent order was executed, in June 1996, Litz received a letter
from the Caroline County Health Department stating that Lake Bonnie
posed a threat to health because the lake continued to receive water contaminated with raw sewage.26 Litz claimed that as a result of her inability to
operate her recreational business because of the lake’s polluted state, she
could not afford to make her mortgage payments on the property.27 The
property was foreclosed and sold to Provident State Bank for $364,000 on
May 14, 2010.28
B. The Procedural History of Litz v. Maryland Department of the
Environment
Litz came before the Court of Appeals of Maryland once before, and
not surprisingly, the case had a somewhat lengthy procedural history.29 On
March 8, 2010, Litz filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Caroline
County, alleging negligence and inverse condemnation against Goldsboro,
the Caroline County Health Department,30 and MDE.31 She also claimed
20. Id. at 259–60, 131 A.3d at 926.
21. See generally id. at 259–61, 131 A.3d at 926–27 (describing the history of the Goldsboro
stormwater drainage and sewage problem and the resulting contamination of Lake Bonnie).
22. Id. at 260, 131 A.3d at 926.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 260–61, 131 A.3d at 927.
26. Id. at 270, 131 A.3d at 932.
27. Id. at 261, 131 A.3d at 927.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 257, 131 A.3d at 925.
30. The Caroline County Health Department was treated as a state agency for purposes of the
litigation. Id. at 261 n.6, 263 n.9; 131 A.3d at 927 n.6, 928 n.9.
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trespass and private and public nuisance against Goldsboro and Caroline
County, and sought a permanent injunction.32 Later, Litz amended the
complaint to add a count for mandamus or equitable relief under the Environmental Standing Act.33 She also added the Maryland Department of
Health and Mental Hygiene (“DHMH”) and the state of Maryland as defendants, claiming negligence, trespass, private and public nuisance, and
inverse condemnation against them, as well as seeking a permanent injunction against them.34 Litz alleged that because of the contamination, she
could no longer operate her recreational business and the property was
“substantially devalued,” resulting in a loss of income that led to her failure
to make mortgage payments on the property,35 which ultimately led the
bank to foreclose on the property.36
Litz’s claims were unsuccessful at the Circuit Court and at the Maryland Court of Special Appeals.37 Maryland, MDE, DHMH, Caroline County, and Goldsboro filed motions to dismiss, and after a hearing the Circuit
Court granted those motions.38 Litz subsequently filed a Motion for Reconsideration and a Third Amended Complaint, which only added factual allegations.39 The Circuit Court denied the Motion for Reconsideration and
dismissed all the claims with prejudice and without leave to amend.40 Litz
appealed the decision and the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed, concluding Litz’s claims were untimely under the relevant statutes
of limitations.41 Litz appealed to the Court of Appeals of Maryland, which
affirmed the Circuit Court’s decision dismissing the nuisance claims, but
reversed the lower court’s dismissal of the trespass and negligence claims.42
31. Id. at 257, 261, 131 A.3d at 925, 927.
32. Id. at 261, 131 A.3d at 927.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 257, 131 A.3d at 925.
37. Id. at 261–62, 131 A.3d at 927–28.
38. Id., 131 A.3d at 927.
39. Id. at 262, 131 A.3d at 927.
40. Id.
41. Litz v. Md. Dep’t of the Env’t, 434 Md. 623, 637, 76 A.3d 1076, 1084 (2013) (hereinafter “Litz I”). The decision by the Court of Special Appeals was unreported. Id.
42. Id. at 642, 76 A.3d at 1087. The Court of Appeals concluded that the lower court erred in
dismissing those claims because a fact finder had not yet concluded whether the acts of trespass
and negligence occurred on a continuing basis during the time period allowed by the statute of
limitations, and therefore the Circuit Court could not conclude whether those claims were barred.
Id. at 647–50, 76 A.3d at 1090–92. Further, the court stated that the inverse condemnation claims
may not be barred because a taking does not occur and the statute of limitations does not begin to
run “until the taking becomes permanent or stabilized.” Id. at 654–57, 76 A.3d at 1094–95. The
taking may not have become permanent until the property was foreclosed, which occurred within
the time period permitted by the statute, and so a fact finder could conclude the inverse condemnation claims were not barred by the statute of limitations. Id. at 656–57, 76 A.3d at 1095.
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The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the Court of Special Appeals, which reviewed the remaining claims in an unreported decision.43
The Court of Special Appeals concluded that the Circuit Court did not err in
dismissing the remaining claims against Maryland and the state agencies,
but did err in dismissing the remaining claims against Goldsboro.44 The
Court of Special Appeals found that the inverse condemnation claims
against Maryland and the state agencies were properly dismissed because
Litz’s claims against them merely constituted “discretionary inaction,”
which could not support an inverse condemnation claim.45 The Court of
Special Appeals reached this conclusion because the court classified the actions of the state and the state agencies as a “failure to regulate.”46 It relied
on federal case law to conclude that a failure of the government to “avert
mitigate, or cure” interference with property rights by third parties was not
sufficient to constitute a taking.47 Following this ruling, Litz filed a second
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari with the Court of Appeals that the court
granted.48 The court reviewed whether the Court of Special Appeals erred
in holding that Litz failed to state a cause of action for inverse condemnation against Maryland, MDE, and DHMH.49
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Takings claims can arise against state and local governments under either the United States Constitution50 or under a state’s own constitution and

43. Litz II, 446 Md. at 262–63, 131 A.3d at 928.
44. Id. at 263, 131 A.3d at 928.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 270–71, 131 A.3d at 933.
47. Id. (first citing Ga. Power Co. v. United States, 633 F.2d 554, 555 (Ct. Cl. 1980); and
then citing Alves v. United States, 133 F.3d 1454, 1455–56 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
48. Id. at 263, 131 A.3d at 928.
49. Id. The full list of questions presented to the court were:
1) Whether the Court of Special Appeals erred when it held that Petitioner failed to
state a cause of action for inverse condemnation against the State government Respondents?
2) Whether an inverse condemnation claim comes within the notice requirements of the
Maryland Tort Claims Act and the Local Government Tort Claims Act?
3) Whether the Court of Special Appeals exceeded the scope of this Court’s remand order when it considered an issue disavowed expressly by Respondents, to wit, Petitioner’s claim for inverse condemnation against the State government Respondents was
subject to the Maryland Tort Claims Act?
4) Whether a trespass claim is covered by the notice requirement of the Local Government Tort Claims Act?
Id. at 263–64, 131 A.3d at 928–9.
50. See Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897) (holding
that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause prohibits a state government from taking private property for public use without just compensation).
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laws.51 This Part will first summarize the background of the Takings
Clause in the U.S. Constitution and how federal courts have interpreted that
clause.52 Next, this Part will look at how Maryland courts have interpreted
Maryland’s own constitutional clause guaranteeing citizens the right to just
compensation for property taken by the state government.53 Finally, this
Part will examine how courts in jurisdictions other than Maryland have decided on the issue presented in Litz.54 Notably, courts have split on the issue of whether inaction can form the sole basis of an inverse condemnation
claim.55 This Part will compare their holdings and reasoning.56
A. Takings Claims Federally and in Maryland
This Section will examine both the federal law and Maryland state law
on takings. The U.S. Constitution provides the basis for federal takings
claims through the Fifth Amendment57 and for state takings claims through
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.58 Maryland also has
its own constitutional provision guaranteeing just compensation for the taking of property by the government.59 Maryland views U.S. Supreme Court
decisions on Fourteenth Amendment takings claims as authoritative on
Maryland’s own constitutional provision prohibiting takings without just
compensation.60
1.

Federal Application of the Takings Clause in the U.S.
Constitution

The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which provides that
“private property [shall not] be taken for public use without just compensation,” serves as the constitutional basis for takings claims.61 This clause of
the Fifth Amendment is known as the Takings Clause. Traditionally, tak51. See, e.g., MD. CONST. art. III, § 40 (“The General Assembly shall enact no Law authorizing private property, to be taken for public use, without just compensation, as agreed upon between the parties, or awarded by a Jury, being first paid or tendered to the party entitled to such
compensation.”).
52. See infra Part II.A.1.
53. See infra Part II.A.2.
54. See infra Part II.B.
55. See infra Part II.B.
56. See infra Part II.B.
57. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
58. Allied American Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Comm’n of Motor Vehicles, 219 Md. 607, 615–16,
150 A.2d 421, 426–27 (1959) (citing Home Utils. Co. v. Revere Copper & Brass, Inc., 209 Md.
610, 122 A.2d 109 (1956); Leonard v. Earle, 55 Md. 252, 260, 141 A. 714 (1928)).
59. MD. CONST. art. III, § 40.
60. Allied American Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 219 Md. at 615–16, 150 A.2d at 426–27 (citing
Home Utils. Co., 209 Md. 610, 122 A.2d 109; Leonard, 55 Md. at 260, 141 A. 714).
61. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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ings were thought only to require compensation when the government physically appropriated the property of a private owner.62 In Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon,63 however, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that regulatory actions could serve as the basis for takings claims that require compensation by the government.64
A person with a real property interest may bring an inverse condemnation claim when a government entity has allegedly committed a taking of
that property interest but did not provide just compensation.65 A taking
may be either partial or complete.66 A partial taking is defined as “one in
which ‘there would be an intrusion so immediate and direct as to subtract
from the owner’s full enjoyment of the property and to limit his exploitation
of it.’”67 A partial taking does not need to be permanent or stabilized, while
a complete taking must be permanent or stabilized.68
To determine whether a particular action constitutes a taking, the
courts conduct a fact-based inquiry into whether the action “forc[es] some
people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice,
should be borne by the public as a whole.”69 In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,70 the U.S. Supreme Court refused to adopt a “set
formula” for this determination, but did identify three factors for courts to
consider in order to determine whether a regulation requires compensating a
private property owner: (1) the economic impact on the property owner, (2)
the diminished expectations of the property owner, and (3) the character of
the government action.71 Further, the Court has held that certain government actions constitute per se takings: (1) when the property owner suffers
a total and complete loss of property value, or (2) when the property owner
suffers a permanent physical invasion of the property.72 However, the
Court only finds such per se takings occur in rare circumstances.73 Addi62. See, e.g., Transp. Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 642 (1878) (requiring “a physical invasion
of the real estate of the private owner, and a practical ouster of his possession” in order for a taking to require just compensation).
63. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
64. Id. at 415.
65. United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980); see also Litz v. Md. Dep’t of the
Env’t, 434 Md. 623, 653, 76 A.3d 1076, 1093 (2013) (citing Coll. Bowl, Inc. v. Mayor & City
Council of Balt., 394 Md. 482, 489, 907 A.2d 153, 157 (2006)) (“Inverse condemnation is a taking
without just compensation.”).
66. Litz I, 434 Md. at 654, 76 A.3d at 1094.
67. Id. (quoting United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 265 (1946)).
68. Id.
69. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
70. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
71. Id. at 123–24.
72. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).
73. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., LLC, 544 U.S. 528, 538 (2005) (describing the per se takings categories as “relatively narrow”); Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning
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tionally, the United States Court of Claims and the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit have held that takings claims only exist
when the government itself causes the damage, and not when the damage is
caused by the “acts of independent third parties.”74
Although federal courts have not decided on the issue of whether inaction can serve as the basis for inverse condemnation claims, at least one
case suggested at the possibility.75 In Columbia Basin Orchard v. United
States,76 the Court of Claims stated that:
To constitute a taking, the overflow of or seepage into the spring
must have been the direct, natural or probable result of an authorized activity and not the incidental or consequential injury inflicted by the action. . . . There must have been an intent on the part
of the defendant to take plaintiff’s property or an intention to do
an act the natural consequence of which was to take its property.77
The court went on to describe a situation in which a government entity
had the requisite intent: when the natural result of discharging a dredging
channel would obviously cause damage to private property.78 This suggested that even though intent is required for an inverse condemnation claim, a
government inaction could potentially constitute an intentional act if the
government’s failure to act would have naturally resulted in the taking of
property.79
2. Takings Claims in Maryland
The state basis for takings claims in Maryland is found in Article III,
Section 40 of the Maryland Constitution, which states that “[t]he General
Assembly shall enact no Law authorizing private property, to be taken for
public use, without just compensation, as agreed upon between the parties,
or awarded by a Jury, being first paid or tendered to the party entitled to
such compensation.”80 Additionally, the Fifth Amendment protection
against takings without just compensation in the U.S. Constitution applies
to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth AmendAgency, 535 U.S. 302, 324 & n.19 (2002) (discussing the per se situations as “relatively rare” and
“narrow”).
74. Ga. Power Co. v. United States, 633 F.2d 554, 556 (Ct. Cl. 1980); see also Alves v. United States, 133 F.3d 1454, 1458 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“The government is not an insurer that private
citizens will act lawfully with respect to property subject to governmental regulation merely because the government has chosen to regulate . . . .”).
75. Columbia Basin Orchard v. United States, 132 F. Supp. 707, 709, 711 (Ct. Cl. 1955).
76. 132 F. Supp. 707 (Ct. Cl. 1955).
77. Id. at 709.
78. Id. at 711.
79. Id. at 709, 711.
80. MD. CONST. art. III, § 40.
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ment.81 The Court of Appeals of Maryland has held that the U.S. Supreme
Court’s decisions on the Fourteenth Amendment in regard to takings claims
are “practically direct authorities” on the Maryland takings provision because the clauses “have the same meaning and effect in reference to an exaction of property.”82
In College Bowl, Inc. v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore,83 the
Court of Appeals stated that inverse condemnation claims might arise from
a variety of factual circumstances, including:
the denial by a governmental agency of access to one’s property,
regulatory actions that effectively deny an owner the physical or
economically viable use of the property, conduct that causes a
physical invasion of the property, hanging a credible and prolonged threat of condemnation over the property in a way that
significantly diminishes its value, or . . . conduct that effectively
forces an owner to sell.84
In Maryland inverse condemnation proceedings, the claimant must
prove (1) that the property was taken and (2) what constitutes “just compensation” under the circumstances.85 In particular, in cases in which the
inverse condemnation claim is not based on a physical invasion, the damage
cannot be “consequential”; rather, “[t]he impact on the plaintiff’s property
ha[s] to be special to it and of a high degree.”86
At least one inverse condemnation case in Maryland discussed inaction as part of the basis for a takings claim.87 In College Bowl, Inc., the petitioner alleged that the petitioner’s lease was terminated due to the City’s
threats to the building owner, forcing the owner to terminate leases and redevelop or face condemnation proceedings.88 In its College Bowl, Inc.
opinion, the Court of Appeals discussed Amen v. City of Dearborn,89 a case
adjudicated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.90

81. Bureau of Mines v. George’s Creek Cool & Land Co., 272 Md. 143, 157–58, 321 A.2d
748, 756 (1974) (citing Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241
(1897)).
82. Allied Am. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Comm’n of Motor Vehicles, 219 Md. 607, 615–16, 150
A.2d 421, 426–27 (1959) (citing Home Utils. Co. v. Revere Copper & Brass, Inc., 209 Md. 610,
122 A.2d 109 (1956); Leonard v. Earle, 55 Md. 252, 260, 141 A. 714 (1928)).
83. 394 Md. 482, 907 A.2d 153 (2006).
84. Id. at 489, 907 A.2d at 157.
85. Millison v. Wilzack, 77 Md. App. 676, 683, 551 A.2d 899, 902 (1989).
86. Md. Port Admin. v. QC Corp., 310 Md. 379, 391, 529 A.2d 829, 834 (1987).
87. See Coll. Bowl, Inc., 394 Md. at 489–99, 907 A.2d at 157 (citing Amen v. City of Dearborn, 718 F.2d 789 (6th Cir. 1983)).
88. Id. at 394 Md. at 487–88, 907 A.2d at 156.
89. 718 F.2d 789 (6th Cir. 1983).
90. Coll. Bowl, Inc., 394 Md. at 490, A.2d at 157 (citing Amen, 718 F.2d 789).
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The Sixth Circuit found in Amen that government inaction,91 together with
certain government actions, constituted a taking based on an “aggregate of
that conduct,” even though none of the actions or inactions individually
would have formed a sufficient basis for the claim.92 The Court of Appeals
relied on Amen’s explanation of aggregate conduct to clarify the level of intrusion necessary to establish a taking.93 The court found, for example, that
in College Bowl, Inc. the City did not reach the adequate level of intrusion.94 Nevertheless, the court has at least acknowledged prior to Litz that
inaction could potentially serve as part a pattern of conduct constituting a
taking.95
B. Inaction as the Basis for Inverse Condemnation Claims Beyond
Maryland
Several states have decided whether government inaction can serve as
the basis for a takings claim.96 Jurisdictions are split on whether inaction
can give rise to a taking.97 Even in those jurisdictions that have held inaction can give rise to a taking, the courts are split on the circumstances under
which it can do so.98 Courts in some jurisdictions have relied on the state’s
definition of takings when faced with the issue,99 while courts in other ju-

91. The government inaction included delaying permits and allowing properties “to remain
vacant and unprotected.” Amen, 718 F.2d at 795 (quoting Amen v. City of Dearborn, 363 F.
Supp. 1267, 1272–73 (E.D. Mich. 1973)).
92. Id. at 795–98.
93. Coll. Bowl, Inc., 394 Md. at 490, A.2d at 157–58 (citing Amen, 718 F.2d 789).
94. Id. (citing Amen, 718 F.2d 789).
95. See id. (citing Amen, 718 F.2d 789) (stating that the “degree of interference” exhibited in
Amen, which based on its claim on both actions and inactions, was sufficient for an inverse condemnation claim).
96. Arreola v. Cty. of Monterey, 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 38, 55 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002); Jordan v. St.
Johns Cty., 63 So. 3d 835, 839 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011); Evenson v. City of Saint Paul Bd. of
Appeals, 467 N.W.2d 363, 365 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991); State ex rel. Blue Springs v. Nixon, 250
S.W.3d 365, 367 (Mo. 2008); Electro-Jet Tool & Mfg. Co. v. City of Albuquerque, 845 P.2d 770,
771, 773, 777 (N.M. 1992); Hawkins v. City of Greenville, 594 S.E.2d 557, 562 (S.C. Ct. App.
2004); Harris Cty. Flood Control Dist. v. Kerr, 499 S.W.3d 793, 799 (Tex. 2016).
97. Compare Evenson, 467 N.W.2d at 365 (holding inaction can serve as the basis for an inverse condemnation claim), with Hawkins, 594 S.E.2d at 562 (holding an affirmative act is required for inverse condemnation claims).
98. Compare Evenson, 467 N.W.2d at 365 (imposing no limits on when inaction can serve as
the basis of an inverse condemnation claim), with Arreola, 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 55 (limiting the
circumstances for inaction as the basis of an inverse condemnation claim to those in which the
defendant failed to act despite a known risk).
99. See, e.g., Hawkins, 594 S.E.2d at 562–63 (holding that because South Carolina courts
have consistently defined inverse condemnation as requiring an affirmative act, inaction alone
cannot support an inverse condemnation claim).
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risdictions relied on the elements required for a taking,100 or on whether the
government had a duty to act.101
1.

Decisions Based on a State-Specific Definition of Inverse
Condemnation

Courts in a couple of jurisdictions have decided whether inaction can
serve as the basis for inverse condemnation claims based on the state’s definition of inverse condemnation.102 For example, South Carolina defines
inverse condemnation as requiring “(1) an affirmative, positive, aggressive
act on the part of the governmental agency; (2) a taking; (3) the taking is for
a public use; and (4) the taking has some degree of permanence.”103 Based
on this definition, which requires an “affirmative, positive, aggressive” act,
South Carolina held that a failure to act could not serve as the basis for an
inverse condemnation claim.104 Similarly, Minnesota relied on its definition
of takings to decide on the issue.105 In Minnesota, however, the standard
for a taking is broad: “governmental action or inaction that deprives a landowner of all reasonable uses of its land.”106 Therefore, in Minnesota, government inaction is expressly a sufficient basis for a takings claim.
2. Decisions Based on the Public Use and Intentional Act
Requirements of an Inverse Condemnation Claim
Several states have placed emphasis on two elements common to most
inverse condemnation laws: (1) that the taking must confer a public benefit
and (2) that government acted intentionally in taking the property.107
Courts in both Texas and New Mexico determined that inaction could not
serve as the basis for inverse condemnation claims because it could not

100. See, e.g., Kerr, 499 S.W.3d at 799 (holding inaction cannot serve as the basis of inverse
condemnation claims because it cannot meet the necessary elements).
101. See, e.g., Jordan, 63 So. 3d at 839 (holding inaction can serve as the basis of inverse
condemnation claims where the defendant had a duty to act).
102. Evenson, 467 N.W.2d at 365; Hawkins, 594 S.E.2d at 562–63.
103. Hawkins, 594 S.E.2d at 562 (citing Marietta Garage, Inc. v. South Carolina Dep’t of Pub.
Safety, 572 S.E.2d 306, 308 (S.C. Ct. App. 2002); Gray v. South Carolina Dep’t of Highways &
Pub. Transp., 427 S.E.2d 899, 902 (S.C. Ct. App. 1992)).
104. Id. at 562–63 (citing Berry’s on Main, Inc. v. City of Columbia, 281 S.E.2d 796, 797
(S.C. 1981)).
105. Evenson, 467 N.W.2d at 365 (citing Czech v. City of Blaine, 253 N.W.2d 272, 274
(Minn. 1977)).
106. Id.
107. See, e.g., Harris Cty. Flood Control Dist. v. Kerr, 499 S.W.3d 793, 799–800, 805 (Tex.
2016) (holding inaction cannot serve as the basis for an inverse condemnation claim because a
failure to act cannot be intentional).
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meet these public use and intent elements.108 In contrast, California determined that under certain circumstances, an inverse condemnation claim
could meet these elements.109
In Texas, the issue first came up in a case in which a landfill’s retention ponds overflowed and caused trash and other contamination to flood
onto the plaintiffs’ property, resulting in damage.110 The Court of Appeals
of Texas stated that the plaintiffs’ claims for inverse condemnation were not
sufficient because, at most, government inaction could result in negligence.111 The court reasoned that a failure to regulate does not confer a
benefit on the public and therefore does not meet the public use element of
a taking.112 In a later Texas Supreme Court case, the court affirmed that inaction could not serve as the basis for an inverse condemnation claim and
clearly stated that an affirmative, intentional act is required for a takings
claim in Texas.113 The Supreme Court of New Mexico reached a similar
conclusion in Electro-Jet Tool and Manufacturing Co. v. City of Albuquerque,114 finding that damage caused by the failure of a drainage ditch was
mere negligence.115 For an inverse condemnation claim to succeed, the
court held that the defendant must have intended or knew that damage
would likely occur.116
In contrast to the decisions in Texas and New Mexico, the California
Court of Appeals held in Arreola v. County of Monterey117 that inaction can
serve as the basis for inverse condemnation claims.118 Despite reaching a
different outcome, the court used reasoning similar to that used by the Texas and New Mexico courts to limit the circumstances under which such a
claim may succeed.119 The court held that inadequate maintenance of public improvement projects can form the basis of an inverse condemnation
claim because acts of maintenance can be considered extensions of public
improvement works.120 By limiting the holding to situations involving a
108. Electro-Jet Tool & Mfg. Co. v. City of Albuquerque, 845 P.2d 770, 771, 773, 777 (N.M.
1992); Kerr, 499 S.W.3d at 799.
109. Arreola v. Cty. of Monterey, 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 38, 53, 55 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
110. City of El Paso v. Ramirez, 349 S.W.3d 181, 183–85 (Tex. Ct. App. 2011).
111. Id. at 187.
112. Id. at 186–87.
113. Kerr, 499 S.W.3d at 799–800, 805.
114. 845 P.2d 770 (N.M. 1992).
115. Id. at 771, 773, 777.
116. Id.
117. 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 38 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
118. Id. at 53.
119. See id. (holding that inaction can serve as the basis for an inverse condemnation claim
when the government failed to act in regard to a public improvement project despite a known
risk).
120. Id.
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public improvement project, the court ensured that the public use element
would be met.121
Similar to the Texas courts,122 the California court found that “simple
negligence cannot support” an inverse condemnation claim.123 The court
held that an inverse condemnation claim had to be supported by a
“show[ing] that the entity was aware of the risk posed by its public improvement and deliberately chose a course of action—or inaction—in the
face of that known risk.”124 Therefore, California requires intent by the
government entity. The court clarified in a later case that a mere failure to
maintain, or “garden variety inadequate maintenance,” of a public works
project is therefore only negligence.125 In order to constitute a taking, the
government entity must have been aware that the failure to maintain a public improvement project would pose a risk to property and, despite this risk,
chose not to maintain the project.126
3. Decisions Based on a Determination of Whether the Defendant
Had a Duty to Act
Several courts based their decisions about inaction in inverse condemnation claims on whether the defendant had a duty to act under the circumstances.127 In Ressel v. Scott County,128 the Missouri Court of Appeals
found that the government defendant could not be held liable under an inverse condemnation claim for the government’s failure to repair a road
washed out by a flood.129 The court determined that the cause of the claimant’s injury was a “force of nature” and found persuasive that other jurisdictions have denied inverse condemnation claims where the damage resulted
from a force of nature rather than a government act.130 Many of the cases
121. Id.
122. City of El Paso v. Ramirez, 349 S.W.3d 181, 187 (Tex. App. 2011) (holding that inaction
by a government defendant cannot support a claim for inverse condemnation).
123. Arreola, 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 53.
124. Id. at 55.
125. Tilton v. Reclamation Dist. No. 800, 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 366, 372–73 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
126. Id.
127. See, e.g., Jordan v. St. Johns Cty., 63 So. 3d 835, 839 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (limiting
inaction as a basis for inverse condemnation claims to circumstances where the defendant had an
affirmative duty to act).
128. 927 S.W.2d 518 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996).
129. Id. at 519–21.
130. Id. at 521 (citing Wildensten v. E. Bay Reg’l Park Dist., 283 Cal. Rptr. 13, 16 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1991); Electro-Jet Tool & Mfg. Co. v. City of Albuquerque, 845 P.2d 770, 773 (N.M. 1992);
Brown v. Sch. Dist. of Greenville Cty., 161 S.E.2d 815, 817 (S.C. 1969); Starks v. Albemarle
Cty., 716 F. Supp. 934, 938 (W.D. Va. 1989)). Though a California case cited by the court,
Wildensten v. East Bay Regional Park District, found no inverse condemnation claim existed
when the government defendant merely failed to stabilize land, resulting in a landslide, later decisions in California have allowed inverse condemnation claims based on inaction in a limited num-
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cited by the court were decided on the grounds that the inverse condemnation claims failed to allege a specific government act that caused the damage; rather, a natural event caused the damage.131 In a subsequent case decided in 2008, the Supreme Court of Missouri discussed Ressel’s
implication that government inaction cannot serve as the basis for an inverse condemnation claim.132 The court held that no inverse condemnation
claim existed where a city failed to realize that an approved plat could not
adequately drain storm water, resulting in flood damage to the claimant’s
property.133 It found that the claimants could not cite any precedent for
government liability resulting from a failure to act, nor could they point to a
legal duty breached by the respondent.134 The court refused to adopt “such
an extreme extension of the law governing inverse condemnation.”135
In Florida, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth District addressed the issue in a case in which the complainants alleged that the respondent county
failed to reasonably maintain and repair a public road, effectively depriving
the complainants of the ability to access their property.136 The court concluded that government inaction in the face of an affirmative duty to act can
support a claim for inverse condemnation.137 The court stated that governments have a duty to maintain their public roads, and a fact finder would
need to determine whether the county fulfilled that duty.138
The Vermont Supreme Court has also held that an inverse condemnation claim can exist where a government entity failed to act when that entity
had a duty to act.139 In Alger v. Dep’t of Labor and Industry,140 the plaintiffs claimed the Vermont Department of Labor and Industry caused an unconstitutional taking of the plaintiffs’ apartment buildings without just
compensation due to the Department’s failure to enforce the housing code
in the buildings.141 The court found that under Vermont law, the Department had “a legal duty to enforce the housing code.”142 Even though the
ber of circumstances, as described in Section II.B.2 of this Note. See Wildensten, 283 Cal. Rptr. at
15; Ressel, 927 S.W.2d at 521; see also Section II.B.2.
131. Ressel, 927 S.W.2d at 521 (citing Wildensten, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 16; Electro-Jet Tool &
Mfg. Co., 845 P.2d at 773; Brown, 161 S.E.2d at 817; Starks, 716 F. Supp. at 938).
132. State ex rel. Blue Springs v. Nixon, 250 S.W.3d 365, 372 (Mo. 2008) (citing Ressel, 927
S.W.2d at 521).
133. Id. at 367.
134. Id. at 372.
135. Id. at 372–73.
136. Jordan v. St. Johns Cty., 63 So. 3d 835, 837 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
137. Id. at 839.
138. Id.
139. Alger v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 917 A.2d 508, 521–22 (Vt. 2006).
140. 917 A.2d 508 (Vt. 2006).
141. Id. at 511.
142. Id. at 517.
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Department was given broad discretion to enforce the code, “a wholesale
failure to enforce the code would violate that duty.”143 The Court further
found that if the plaintiffs’ allegations were true:
the Department knew of the relevant code violations, and . . . it
chose to allow the violations to continue until they became serious enough to require removal of the tenants or termination of
utility service. But for the Department’s failure to act, there
would have been no nuisance to abate, and plaintiffs’ property
would not have been taken.144
The court concluded therefore that the plaintiffs were entitled to just
compensation.145 Notably, the court recognized that though the “plaintiffs’
takings claims are unusual . . . [w]e need only ascertain that plaintiffs’
complaint corresponds to general takings principals, and we conclude that it
does.”146 Additionally, the court did not make any sweeping statements
about whether and under what circumstances other inactions by a government entity could serve as the basis for future takings claims.147
III. THE COURT’S REASONING
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held in Litz that a plaintiff can adequately plead an inverse condemnation claim where the plaintiff alleges a
government entity’s failure to act in the face of an affirmative duty to act
resulted in a taking.148 The court further held that Litz had therefore sufficiently stated a claim for inverse condemnation against the Respondents at
the current stage of the litigation.149 The court found that no Maryland law
existed that contemplated whether government inaction can result in a taking.150 The court thus surveyed other jurisdictions to determine how other
courts have decided cases with similar issues.151 Holding that the Court of
Special Appeals of Maryland improperly dismissed the inverse condemnation claims against the state and its agencies, the Court of Appeals remand-

143. Id.
144. Id. at 521–22.
145. Id. at 517, 521–22.
146. Id. at 521.
147. Id. at 521–22.
148. Litz v. Md. Dep’t of the Env’t, 446 Md. 254, 267, 131 A.3d 923, 931 (2016). The Court
also held that trespass is covered by the notice requirement of the Local Governmental Tort
Claims Act (“LGTCA”) and that inverse condemnation claims are not covered by the notice requirements of the Maryland Tort Claims Act or the LGTCA. Id. at 264, 131 A.3d at 928–29.
These holdings are not discussed substantially in this Note.
149. Id. at 264, 267, 131 A.3d at 929, 931.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 268, 131 A.3d at 931.
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ed the case to the Court of Special Appeals “with instructions to remand the
case to the Circuit Court for Caroline County for further proceedings.”152
The jurisdictions discussed by the court in its opinion—California,
Florida, Minnesota, and South Carolina—were split on whether government
inaction is sufficient to constitute a taking.153 In particular, Minnesota,
Florida, and California all held that government inaction could be the basis
for an inverse condemnation claim.154 In contrast, the South Carolina Court
of Appeals held that inaction could not form the basis of an inverse condemnation claim.155 The court noted the precise reasons for the particular
holdings in each jurisdiction, and found only the reasoning of the Florida
and California courts persuasive.156 The court found that South Carolina’s
case law prescribed a much narrower requirement for an inverse condemnation claim than found in Maryland case law: “an affirmative, positive, aggressive act.”157 Thus, the court did not find South Carolina’s holding persuasive because Maryland law establishes no such specific requirement.158
The court also declined to follow Minnesota’s broad standard for inverse condemnation claims.159 Minnesota defines a taking as “government
action or inaction that deprives a landowner of all reasonable uses of its
land.”160 Rather, the court found persuasive decisions made by courts in
Florida and California, which held that government inaction is sufficient as
a basis for an inverse condemnation claim only when the government has
an affirmative duty to act or when the government failed to act despite a
known risk.161 The court found these decisions relevant because the Respondents were warned of the contamination risk through a 1985 study
conducted by the Caroline County Health Department and subsequent
warnings over the next two decades.162 Additionally, the court concluded,
152. Id. at 280–81, 131 A.3d at 939.
153. Id. at 268–69, 131 A.3d at 931–32 (citing Jordan v. Saint Johns Cty., 63 So. 3d 835, 839
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011); Arreola v. Cty. of Monterey, 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 38, 55 (Cal. Ct. App.
2002); Hawkins v. City of Greenville, 594 S.E.2d 557, 562 (S.C. Ct. App. 2004); Evenson v. City
of Saint Paul Bd. of Appeals, 467 N.W.2d 363, 365 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991)).
154. Id. (citing Jordan, 63 So. 3d at 839; Arreola, 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 55; Evenson, 467
N.W.2d at 365).
155. Id. (citing Hawkins, 594 S.E.2d at 562).
156. Id. at 268–70, 131 A.3d at 931–32 (citing Jordan, 63 So. 3d at 839; Arreola, 122 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 55, 69–72; Hawkins, 594 S.E.2d at 262; Evenson, 467 N.W.2d at 365).
157. Id. at 268, 131 A.3d at 931 (quoting Hawkins, 594 S.E.2d at 262).
158. Id.
159. Id., 131 A.3d at 931–32 (“We find more persuasive cases which sanction a plaintiff advancing an inverse condemnation claim in the face of government inaction where the government
agency had an affirmative duty to act . . . .”).
160. Id., 131 A.3d at 931 (quoting Evenson, 467 N.W.2d at 365) (emphasis added).
161. Id. at 269, 131 A.3d at 932 (citing Jordan, 63 So. 3d at 839; Arreola, 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
55).
162. Id. at 269–73, 131 A.3d at 932.
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the Respondents may have had an affirmative duty to correct the contamination problem or penalize Goldsboro for failing to correct the problem.163
The court disagreed with the Court of Special Appeals, which characterized the actions of the Respondents as a “failure to regulate.”164 It did
not find the cases cited by the Court of Special Appeals to support its “failure to regulate” characterization persuasive because those cases involved
government failures to “avert, mitigate, or cure” interference with property
rights by third parties.165 The court argued that in those cases, the claims
did not constitute a taking “because the regulations [at issue] imposed by
the Federal Government were not meant to act as an ‘insurer that private
citizens will act lawfully with respect to property subject to governmental
regulation.’”166 It reasoned that Litz’s case was “not merely a case of a
property right being affected adversely by private and third parties solely
and exclusively,” but, rather, one in which the Respondents failed to act
when they had “an affirmative duty to abate a known and longstanding public health hazard.”167 The Respondents had knowledge of the failing sewage and drainage systems, as well as knowledge of the serious contamination resulting from its failure to repair the systems, including the
contamination of Lake Bonnie.168 The court concluded the Respondents
may have had a duty to resolve such a problem in the interest of protecting
public health.169
The court further concluded that in addition to a duty to protect public
health, the State of Maryland, its agencies, and Goldsboro may have had a
“general or specific statutory” duty to act in the situation under state environmental statutes. Specifically, the Environment Article gives MDE the
power to enforce the Federal Water Pollution Control Act170 and the HealthEnvironmental Article gives DHMH the power to compel sewage operations as necessary for “public health and comfort.”171 Additionally, the
court also pointed out that even if no “general or specific statutory” duty to
act existed, Maryland and Goldsboro may have created an affirmative duty
to act by entering into the consent order.172 The court therefore held be-

163. Id., 131 A.3d at 932–33.
164. Id. at 270, 131 A.3d at 933.
165. Id. at 270–71, 131 A.3d at 933 (citing Alves v. United States, 133 F.3d 1454, 1455–56
(Fed. Cir. 1998); Ga. Power Co. v. United States, 633 F.2d 554, 555 (Ct. Cl. 1980)).
166. Id. (quoting Alves, 133 F.3d at 1458).
167. Id. at 272, 131 A.3d at 933–34.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2012).
171. Litz II, 446 Md. at 272–73, 131 A.3d at 934 (quoting State Dep’t of Env’t v. Showell, 316
Md. 259, 270, 558 A.2d 391, 396 (1989)).
172. Id. at 273, 131 A.3d at 934.
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cause the state, its agencies, and Goldsboro may have had an affirmative
duty to act, Litz sufficiently pleaded her claims for inverse condemnation.173 Noting that although Litz may not ultimately succeed in proving her
claims, the court could not conclude as a matter of law at the motion to
dismiss stage of the litigation that she would not be able to prove her
claims.174
In a dissenting opinion, joined by Judges Battaglia and McDonald,
Judge Watts dissented from the majority’s holding that government inaction
can form the basis of an inverse condemnation claim.175 Judge Watts argued that “[t]he definition of ‘inverse condemnation,’ examples of claims
for inverse condemnation, and judicial restraint” lead to the result that an
affirmative act is required to make a claim that a taking occurred.176 The
dissenters would have held that an affirmative act is required.177 Judge
Watts noted that when the case was first considered by the court in 2013 on
appeal under different grounds, the court stated that an inverse condemnation claim requires that the property was “taken in fact,” which Judge Watts
interpreted as requiring an affirmative action.178 In all of the examples of
inverse condemnation claims decided or even contemplated under Maryland
case law, all such claims involved an affirmative act, and not inaction.179
Judge Watts further argued that the majority’s decision effectively
“creat[es] a private right of action anytime a plaintiff’s property decreases
in value as a result of a governmental entity’s noncompliance with a statute.”180 Examining the language of the relevant portion of the Environment
Article and noting that the majority did not examine the legislative history
of the article to determine the intent of the legislature, Judge Watts found
no indication that the General Assembly intended for the statute to create
such a private right of action.181 Judge Watts concluded that the majority

173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 281–82, 131 A.3d at 939–40 (Watts, J., dissenting).
176. Id. at 282–83, 131 A.3d at 940.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 283, 131 A.3d at 940 (quoting Litz v. Md. Dep’t of the Env’t, 434 Md. 623, 653, 76
A.3d 1076, 1093 (2013)).
179. Id. at 283–85, 131 A.3d at 940–41 (citing Muskin v. State Dep’t of Assessments & Taxation, 442 Md. 544, 566, 30 A.3d 962, 974 (2011); Coll. Bowl, Inc. v. Mayor & City Council of
Balt., 394 Md. 482, 489, 907 A.2d 153, 157 (2006); Reichs Ford Rd. Joint Venture v. State Rds.
Comm’n of the State Highway Admin., 388 Md. 500, 504–06, 880 A.2d 307, 309–10 (2005); City
of Annapolis v. Waterman, 357 Md. 484, 507, 745 A.2d 1000, 1012 (2000); MacLeod v. City of
Takoma Park, 257 Md. 477, 481, 478, 263 A.2d 581, 582, 584 (1970)).
180. Id. at 285, 131 A.3d at 941.
181. Id. at 285–86, 131 A.3d at 941–42 (citing MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. § 9-253 (LexisNexis
2013); Walton v. Mariner Health of Md., Inc., 391 Md. 643, 669, 894 A.2d 584, 599 (2006)).
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“greatly expand[ed] the definition of inverse condemnation, the consequences of which are yet to be seen.”182
IV. ANALYSIS
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held for the first time in Litz that
inaction can serve as the basis for an inverse condemnation claim when the
government fails to act despite a duty to do so.183 Other jurisdictions have
held similarly, and the Court of Appeals justifiably found persuasive the
reasoning of those courts.184 The decision in Litz is also consistent with the
policy objectives behind takings clauses on both the federal and state level.185 Additionally, the majority’s reasoning in Litz will avoid the negative
consequences the dissent argues will occur as a result of the holding,186 because the holding only applies in circumstances where the government had
an affirmative duty to act, which the courts can limit in the future.187
A. The Court of Appeals Properly Found Convincing the Reasoning of
the California and Florida Courts
The cases on which the Court of Appeals of Maryland relied were
those in which the courts found inaction could serve as the basis for an inverse condemnation claim when the government entity had an affirmative
duty to act or failed to act despite a known risk.188 The Maryland court was
justified in finding these cases persuasive not only because of the factual
similarities between Litz and those cases, but also because of the reasoning
used to reach the holdings in those cases.189
In contrast, the majority in Litz found the reasoning in Evenson v. City
of Saint Paul Board of Appeals190 and Hawkins v. City of Greenville,191 the
cases from Minnesota and South Carolina, unconvincing.192 The majority
182. Id. at 286, 131 A.3d at 942.
183. Id. at 267, 131 A.3d at 931 (majority opinion).
184. Id., 131 A.3d at 932 (citing Jordan v. Saint Johns Cty., 63 So. 3d 835, 839 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2011); Arreola v. Cty. of Monterey, 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 38, 55, 6972 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002)).
185. See infra Part IV.B (discussing how the holding in Litz relates to prior takings cases federally and in Maryland).
186. See generally Litz II, 446 Md. at 282–86, 131 A.3d at 940–42 (Watts, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority’s holding unreasonably expands the definition of inverse condemnation).
187. See infra Part IV.C (discussing how the majority’s holding avoids the negative consequences asserted by the dissent).
188. Litz II, 446 Md. at 269, 131 A.3d at 932 (citing Jordan v. Saint Johns Cty., 63 So. 3d 835,
839 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011); Arreola v. Cty. of Monterey, 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 38, 50 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2002)).
189. See supra Part II.B.1–2 (summarizing the decisions of the California and Florida courts).
190. 467 N.W.2d 363, 365 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
191. 594 S.E.2d 557, 562 (S.C. Ct. App. 2004).
192. Litz II, 446 Md. at 268, 131 A.3d at 931.
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found the doctrine put forth by Minnesota was overly broad—it stated that
any inaction which deprived an owner of “all reasonable uses” was a taking.193 In contrast, the majority found the South Carolina definition of takings was more specific than the Maryland definition.194 Therefore, the court
was justified in choosing not to rely on the reasoning of these courts, which
based their decisions on state-specific definitions.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland found most persuasive two cases
from Florida and California195: Arreola v County of Monterey and Jordan v.
Saint Johns County.196 Both of these cases involved the government’s failure to adequately maintain public improvement projects—a road in Jordan197 and a levee in Arreola.198 Similarly, Litz involved Goldsboro’s failure to develop a public sewage system and the State of Maryland’s failure
to enforce the installation of such a system.199 The Litz court thus relied on
cases with similar facts. Additionally, although not discussed in Litz, the
Vermont case Alger is also factually similar to Litz because in Alger, as in
Litz, the claimant alleged a taking resulting from the government’s failure
to enforce a state law.200
The Court of Appeals of Maryland did not consider the decisions of
several other states which have touched on the issue of whether inaction can
support an inverse condemnation claim, such as decisions in New Mexico
and Texas.201 Even though the New Mexico and Texas courts found that
under the specific circumstances of those cases the inverse condemnation
claims could not succeed,202 the decisions can be reconciled with courts that
ruled inaction could serve as the basis for inverse condemnation claims.

193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 269, 131 A.3d at 932 (citing Arreola v. Cty. of Monterey, 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 38, 55
(Cal. Ct. App. 2002); Jordan v. Saint Johns Cty., 63 So. 3d 835, 839 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)).
196. 63 So. 3d 835 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
197. Id. at 836.
198. Arreola, 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 44.
199. See generally Litz II, 446 Md. at 265, 131 A.3d at 925–27 (outlining the factual history of
the case and the allegations put forth in the complaint).
200. Compare id. at 272–73; 131 A.3d at 934 (“Ms. Litz contends that she alleged sufficiently
a cause of action for inverse condemnation by alleging that the failure of Respondents to address
the pollution and sewage problems led directly to the substantial devaluing of her property and its
ultimate loss.”), with Alger v. Dep’t of Labor & Industry, 917 A.2d 508, 513 (Vt. 2006) (“Plaintiffs alleged that the Department’s actions were consistent with its general failure to enforce the
housing code . . . . The amended complaint also contained the previous complaints’ claims that the
Department took plaintiffs’ property without due process or just compensation . . . .”).
201. See generally Litz II at 268–69, 131 A.3d 931–32 (examining only the decisions made by
the California, Florida, Minnesota, and South Carolina courts); supra Part II.B.2 (describing the
decisions of the New Mexico and Texas courts).
202. See supra Part II.B.2 (summarizing the holdings and reasoning of the New Mexico and
Texas courts).
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The Supreme Court of Texas held that inaction could never rise above
the level of negligence.203 The court, however, also stated “the requisite intent is present when a governmental entity knows that a specific act is causing identifiable harm or knows that the harm is substantially certain to result.”204 And, in City of Dallas v. Jennings,205 the same court stated: “There
may well be times when a governmental entity is aware that its action will
necessarily cause physical damage to certain private property, and yet determines that the benefit to the public outweighs the harm caused to that
property.”206
Therefore, Texas appears to have left open the possibility that the affirmative act of deciding not act could potentially serve as the basis for an
inverse condemnation claim. The New Mexico decision similarly suggests
that the defective maintenance of a public use project with the defendant’s
“knowledge of a substantial probability of damage” or a deliberately calculated risk could support an inverse condemnation claim.207 The Court of
Claims also suggested that a failure to act might still be intentional if the
known result of that failure would be damage to private property.208 These
implications in the Texas, New Mexico, and Court of Claims decisions are
remarkably similar to the holding of the California Court of Appeals in Arreola—that inaction can serve as the basis for an inverse condemnation
claim only when the government entity “deliberately chose a course of action—or inaction.”209 This holding could be interpreted as still requiring an
affirmative act—the affirmative act of deciding not to act.
In scope and in language, Maryland’s holding is most similar to Florida’s holding—both require an affirmative duty to act in order for a government’s failure to act to constitute a taking.210 Given the factual circumstances in Litz, however, the decision is also consistent with the reasoning
of the California Court of Appeals in Arreola. Specifically, the government
defendants in Litz had knowledge that the failure to act would result in the
continued pollution of Lake Bonnie and yet chose not to enforce the con-

203. Harris Cty. Flood Control Dist. v. Kerr, 499 S.W.3d 793, 799 (Tex. 2016).
204. Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Gragg, 151 S.W.3d 546, 555 (Tex. 2004).
205. 142 S.W.3d 310 (Tex. 2004)).
206. Id. at 314.
207. Electro-Jet Tool & Mfg. Co. v. City of Albuquerque, 845 P.2d 770, 773, 777–79 (N.M.
1992).
208. Columbia Basin Orchard v. United States, 132 F. Supp. 707, 709, 711 (Ct. Cl. 1955).
209. Arreola v. Cty. of Monterey, 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 38, 55 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
210. Compare Litz v. Md. Dep’t of Env’t, 446 Md. 254, 267, 131 A.3d 931 (2016) (“[A]n inverse condemnation claim is pleaded adequately where a plaintiff alleges a taking caused by a
governmental entity’s or entities’ failure to act, in the face of an affirmative duty to act.”), with
Jordan v. St. Johns Cty., 63 So. 3d 835, 839 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (“[G]overnmental inaction—in the face of an affirmative duty to act—can support a claim for inverse condemnation.”).
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struction of a sewage system.211 In both Litz and Arreola, the government
defendants knew that their failure to act would result in damage to private
property and nevertheless chose not to act.212 Therefore, the Court of Appeals was justified in relying on the Florida and California cases, based both
on the similarity of the factual circumstances, and on the reasoning used by
the courts.
B. The Holding of Litz Supports the Goals of Takings Jurisprudence
The court’s decision to expand the doctrine of inverse condemnation to
include government inaction comports with the purposes of the takings
clause as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court and Maryland courts. The
U.S. Supreme Court stated that the goal of the federal takings clause is to
prevent the government “from forcing some people alone to bear public
burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
whole.”213 The Court of Appeals cites this language frequently in its own
takings cases,214 including in Litz.215 This view of the takings clause, as
well as the factual and legal circumstances of Litz, may have influenced the
court’s decision.216 While Litz’s claims might better be expressed as tort
claims, such as nuisance and trespass—Litz in fact alleged claims of nuisance, negligence, and trespass—her tort claims against the state and the
state agencies were all barred either by statutes of limitation, the notice requirements of the Maryland Tort Claims Act, or sovereign immunity.217
As a local newspaper pointed out in regard to the court’s decision:
“The decision is significant not just because the state has resources that
small towns like Goldsboro do not, but also because the state has issued
hundreds of similar orders to fix pollution, but doesn’t enforce them all.”218

211. Litz II, 446 Md. 272, 131 A.3d 934 (2016).
212. Id.; Arreola, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 55, 57.
213. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
214. See, e.g., Coll. Bowl, Inc. v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 394 Md. 482, 489, 907 A.2d
153, 157 (2006) (quoting PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980)); Reichs
Ford Rd. Joint Venture v. State Rds. Comm’n of the State Highway Admin., 388 Md. 500, 511,
880 A.2d 307, 313 (2005) (using similar language to explain that “the economic impact of a public project” should not be borne by “a group of individual property owners” (citing Armstrong,
364 U.S. at 49)).
215. 446 Md. at 266, 131 A.3d at 930 (quoting Coll. Bowl, Inc., 394 Md. at 289, 907 A.2d at
157).
216. Id. at 267, 131 A.3d at 931.
217. See generally id. at 261–64, 131 A.3d at 927–29 (citing Litz v. Md. Dep’t of Env’t, 434
Md. 623, 642, 76 A.3d 1076, 1087 (2013) (describing the procedural history of the case).
218. Rona Kobell, Maryland Court Revives Water Pollution Lawsuit Against State, BAY J.
(Feb. 1, 2016), http://www.bayjournal.com/article/maryland_court_revives_water_pollution_law
suit_against_state.
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Indeed, the population of Goldsboro was 264 people as of 2010219 and, as
the article noted, the town’s residents could not afford even ten percent of
the total cost of the very public sewer system at issue in the case.220 Therefore, without the opportunity to recover from the state through her inverse
condemnation claims, Litz would be left only with her claims against the
town, lessening the possibility that she would recover any actual monetary
compensation if her claims are eventually successful. Allowing Litz to recover on inverse condemnation theory fits into the policy justifications underlying the takings theory to compensate individuals whose property is inequitably taken by the government.
The court took the view that the government respondents in Litz may
have been responsible for the property damage at issue, and if so, would
owe the petitioner just compensation.221 In particular, the court pointed out
that Litz did not allege that her property was “affected adversely by private
third parties solely and exclusively.”222 Indeed, federal courts have expressly denied that the government is responsible for compensating takings of
regulated property committed by third parties.223 Rather, the petitioner’s
property was “‘condemned’ by the failure of the State and Town . . . to
abate a known and longstanding public health hazard.”224 The court reasoned that the town and the state may have had affirmative duties to act to
prevent or limit such a hazard generally, or specifically under the Consent
Order entered into by the town and MDE.225 The court indicated that such a
duty does not exist when the government merely fails to enforce the conduct of third parties with respect to property rights regulated by the government.226 Specifically, the court pointed to the statutory powers of the
state agencies to make and enforce rules and Consent Orders in the interest
of protecting public health and preventing pollution.227 The court held the
219. Goldsboro, MD. STATE ARCHIVES, http://msa.maryland.gov/msa/mdmanual/37mun/golds
boro/html/g.html (last updated Jan. 10, 2017). Caroline County had a population of 33,066 as of
2010. Caroline County, Maryland, MD. STATE ARCHIVES, http://msa.maryland.gov/msa/mdman
ual/36loc/caro/html/caro.html (last updated Aug. 26, 2016).
220. Kobell, supra note 218.
221. 446 Md. at 273; 131 A.3d at 934.
222. Id. at 272, 131 A.3d at 934.
223. Alves v. United States, 133 F.3d 1454, 1458 (1998); Georgia Power Co. v. United States,
633 F.2d 554, 556 (Ct. Cl. 1980) (citing Minot v. United States, 546 F.2d 378 (Ct. Cl. 1976)). See
also Litz II, 446 Md. at 271, 131 A.3d at 933 (“Neither [Alves nor Georgia Power Co.] resulted in
a ‘taking’ because the regulations imposed by the Federal Government were not meant to act as an
‘insurer that private citizens will act lawfully with respect to property subject to governmental
regulation.’” (quoting Alves, 133 F.3d at 1458)).
224. Litz II, 446 Md. at 272, 131 A.3d at 934.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 271–72, 131 A.3d at 933.
227. Id. at 272–73, 131 A.3d at 934 (quoting State Dep’t of Env’t v. Showell, 316 Md. 259,
264, 270, 558 A.2d 391, 393, 396 (1989)).
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lower court must determine whether such an affirmative duty existed.228
According to the court, a taking can only occur when the government entity
had an affirmative duty to act and failed to do so.229 The decision therefore
leaves open the possibility that Litz may recover on her claims and that future complainants may obtain recovery from damages resulting from a government entity’s failure to fulfill an affirmative duty.
In his article Passive Takings, Professor Christopher Serkin argues that
inaction should be a sufficient basis for takings claims because such takings
claims could ensure government actions are benefiting the public.230 He argues that such claims are justified because property owners can inequitably
suffer costs from government inaction just as they suffer costs from government actions.231 Claims like the one at issue in Litz seem to fit within
these policy objectives of takings claims. In Litz, the failure to develop a
public sewer system disproportionately impacted Litz because the lake on
her property was contaminated to the point where she could no longer operate her business.232 The cost of building a sewer system, however, should
have been borne by the public through taxpayer funds collected and used by
the government.233 The court embraced the view that the government may
have effectively condemned Litz’s property by forcing her to bear the costs
of the government’s failure to build a public sewer system.234 Allowing her
claim to continue past the motion to dismiss stage of the litigation therefore
comports with the fairness-based theory of takings,235 because it requires
the government to bear the cost of failing to build the sewage system if the
government had an affirmative duty to do so.236
C. The Majority Opinion Avoids the Negative Consequences Suggested
by the Dissenting Opinion
The dissenting opinion authored by Judge Watts argued that the decision by the majority in Litz contradicts Maryland’s takings jurisprudence.237
Judge Watts offered several reasons why Maryland should only recognize
inverse condemnation claims that plead a taking due to a government ac-

228. Id. at 273; 131 A.3d at 934.
229. Id.
230. Christopher Serkin, Passive Takings: The State’s Affirmative Duty to Protect Property,
113 MICH. L. REV. 345, 362 (2014).
231. Id.
232. 446 Md. at 264, 131 A.3d at 929.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 272, 131 A.3d at 934.
235. Serkin, supra note 230, at 364.
236. Litz II, 446 Md. at 273, 131 A.3d at 934.
237. Id. at 283–85, 131 A.3d at 940 (Watts, J., dissenting).
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tion, and not due to government action.238 However, the majority’s reasoning was actually consistent with takings jurisprudence, and Maryland can
avoid the negative consequences asserted by the dissenting opinion. Further, the holding in Litz can be limited in the future, and therefore will not
vastly increase takings litigation as the Maryland courts can clarify the exact scope of the holding through application.239
1.

Nothing in Maryland Takings Jurisprudence Prevented the
Majority from Holding Inaction Can Constitute a Taking

Judge Watts argued that the very term “take” requires the government
to take “some kind of affirmative action, as opposed to an omission.”240
Further, Judge Watts argued that Maryland’s description of what actions
constitute the basis for inverse condemnation claims in prior cases did not
contemplate inaction, only affirmative acts.241 The majority’s holding,
however, has a sufficient basis in federal and state takings jurisprudence.
While the U.S. Supreme Court has never recognized an inaction as the basis
for an inverse condemnation claim, the Court also has never rejected the
theory. Further, several states other than Maryland have held that a government’s failure to act, at least in certain circumstances, can constitute a
basis for inverse condemnation.242 Although several other courts agreed
with the dissent’s view of the definition of a taking, the holdings in some of
those jurisdictions are not inconsistent with Litz.243
While the Maryland Court of Appeals has not previously recognized
that government inaction can serve as the basis for inverse condemnation,
the court has also never addressed the issue before.244 The court previously
outlined examples of inverse condemnation, but it did not state that inverse
condemnation claims were limited to such examples.245 Therefore, nothing
in Maryland’s takings jurisprudence prevented the court from deciding that
inaction could serve as the basis for inverse condemnation claims. In particular, the majority may have been concerned that Litz’s case and any simi238. Id. at 940–41.
239. See infra Part IV.C.2.
240. Litz II, 446 Md. at 283, 131 A.3d at 940 (Watts, J., dissenting).
241. Id. at 284, 131 A.3d at 941.
242. See supra Part II.B (discussing the holdings of Minnesota, Florida, California, and Vermont that inaction can serve as the basis for an inverse condemnation claim in some circumstances).
243. See supra Part IV.A (comparing the reasoning of courts that have previously ruled on the
issue with the Court of Appeals’ reasoning).
244. See Litz II, 446 Md. at 267, 131 A.3d at 931 (finding no Maryland law is controlling on
the issue of whether government inaction can serve as the basis for an inverse condemnation
claim).
245. Coll. Bowl, Inc. v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 394 Md. 482, 489, 907 A.2d 153, 157
(2006).
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lar cases that may arise could only be resolved “in all fairness and justice”246 by allowing inaction to serve as a basis for inverse condemnation.
While the court did not directly articulate such an intention, instead stating
merely that it found the California and Florida cases persuasive,247 the intention seems implied from Litz’s sympathetic situation,248 the quote used
to open the opinion,249 and the court’s emphasis that the town and the state
failed “to abate a known and longstanding public health hazard.”250
2. The Decision Can Be Limited in the Future
In Litz, the Court of Appeals of Maryland was clear that the holding
that government inaction can serve as a basis for inverse condemnation
claims was limited to circumstances where the government had an affirmative duty to act.251 The court also made clear that no affirmative duty to act
might actually exist in Litz, noting that at the time the decision was handed
down, the parties had neither briefed nor argued the issue.252 Beyond these
limitations, the court did not provide much direction as to the potential
scope of its holding. Such a vague holding, at first glance, may not appear
beneficial to litigants desiring predictability, especially government entities
that may now face new claims based on their inaction.253 Although the dissent argued that the holding “greatly expands the definition of inverse condemnation,”254 the court will have an opportunity to narrow the application
of the holding to specific factual or legal circumstances as cases arise. Further, the holding is already limited in that claimant must demonstrate that
the government entity had a legal duty to act, not just the power to act.255

246. Litz II, 446 Md. at 266, 131 A.3d at 930 (quoting Coll. Bowl, Inc., 394 Md. at 489, 907
A.3d at 157).
247. Id. at 269–70, 131 A.3d at 932.
248. See generally id. at 257–61, 131 A.3d at 925–27 (describing the factual background of
the case). Additional details regarding Litz’s history with the property can be found in a local
newspaper article about the case. Kobell, supra note 218. Notably, Litz planned to use the
campground business to fund her retirement and planned to pass the property on to her children,
but now she has lost the property to foreclosure and currently lives with her son and his family.
Id.
249. “The nine most terrifying words in the English language are, ‘I’m from the government
and I’m here to help.’” Litz II, 446 Md. at 257, 131 A.3d at 924 (quoting President Ronald
Reagan, Statement at a Chicago Press Conference (August 12, 1986)).
250. Id. at 272, 131 A.3d at 934.
251. Id. at 267, 131 A.3d at 931.
252. Id. at 273, 131 A.3d at 934.
253. For example, a representative of the environmental group Chesapeake Legal Alliance
stated the decision will allow environmental groups to ensure the state enforces consent orders
requiring the prevention, reduction, or clean-up of pollution. Kobell, supra note 218.
254. Litz II, 446 Md. at 286, 131 A.3d at 942 (Watts, J., dissenting).
255. Id. at 267, 131 A.3d at 931 (majority opinion).
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Takings cases are already decided on a fact-specific, case-by-case basis.256 The court’s holding in Litz merely imposes another inquiry in cases
based on inaction: whether the defendant had an affirmative duty to do
act.257 The U.S. Supreme Court recognizes only two limited instances
where government action constitutes a per se taking: (1) when the government entity physically invades or compels the physical invasion of the
property, and (2) when the action results in a total loss of the property’s
value.258 Further, the Court has so narrowly interpreted per se takings that
such takings are rarely found, especially under the total loss of value standard.259 In all other circumstances, takings claims are analyzed by the court
using the factors outlined by the U.S. Supreme Court in Penn Central
Transportation Company v. New York City.260 The Court has outright stated
that it:
has been unable to determine any “set formula” for determining
when “justice and fairness” require that economic injuries caused
by public action be compensated by the government . . . whether
a particular restriction will be rendered invalid by the government’s failure to pay for any losses proximately caused by it depends largely “upon the particular circumstances [in that]
case.”261
As the Court of Appeals pointed out, it is entirely possible that Litz
may not succeed in her claim for inverse condemnation, because the state
and the town may not have had affirmative duties to act and Litz may not be
able to prove that damage to her property rises to the level of a taking for
which compensation is required.262 The dissent argued that the statute the
majority relied on to find the respondents might have had an affirmative duty to act263 did not create a private right of action.264 Therefore, the dissent
argued, the majority’s opinion improperly created such a private right.265
256. Id., 131 A.3d at 930.
257. Id., 131 A.3d at 931.
258. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).
259. John D. Echeverria, Making Sense of Penn Central, 23 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 171,
173 (2005).
260. 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); see also Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 330 (2002); Echeverria, supra note 259, at 173.
261. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124 (citation omitted) (first citing Goldblatt v.
Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962); and then quoting United States v. Cent. Eureka Mining
Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958)).
262. Litz II, 446 Md. at 273, 131 A.3d at 934 (majority opinion); see also Millison v. Wilzack,
77 Md. App. 676, 683, 551 A.2d 899, 902 (1989) (stating that inverse condemnation complainants
must demonstrate that their property was taken and how much compensation is owed).
263. MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. § 9-253 (LexisNexis 2014).
264. Litz II, 446 Md. at 285, 131 A.3d at 941–42 (Watts, J., dissenting).
265. Id.

2017]

LITZ V. MARYLAND DEP’T OF THE ENVIRONMENT

81

However, the majority opinion merely stated that the statute, or the Consent
Order, may have created an affirmative duty.266 The court was careful to
specify that the parties neither briefed nor argued the question of whether
such affirmative duties existed, and therefore the court could properly resolve the issue on remand.267 Indeed, Litz did not bring a claim under the
Environmental Code, but rather her claim arose under the takings provision
of the Maryland Constitution.268
We can use the facts in Litz to analyze the extent to which the court’s
holding may be limited in the future based on what could occur on remand
in the case. On remand, Litz will need to prove that the Respondents had an
affirmative duty to act.269 Comparing the circumstances in Litz to cases in
which courts held the government entity did have an affirmative duty to act,
the circumstances are relatively similar, and on remand the court could find
those cases persuasive.270 Similar to the government actors in Arreola, Jordan, and Alger, the Respondents in Litz were aware that their failure to act
would and did result in extensive damage to private property.271 Even if
Litz can establish that an affirmative duty to act existed, she may not be
able to recover under her inverse condemnation claim. Her property does
not fit within the per se takings category of total loss of property value.272
The fact that her property was sold for $364,000 in the foreclosure action
rules out the possibility of total loss of value.273
Litz may argue that her claim fits within another category of per se
takings: that the government compelled a physical invasion of her property.274 However, to take advantage of the per se takings rule, Litz would
266. Id. at 272, 131 A.3d 934 (majority opinion) (stating that although the issue of whether an
affirmative duty existed remained to be decided, “it is not frivolous to hypothesize that state,
county, and municipal agencies may have duties to step in to protect the public health”).
267. Id.
268. Id. at 265–66, 131 A.3d at 930.
269. Id. at 273, 131 A.3d at 934.
270. See supra Part IV.A.1 (comparing the circumstances in Litz with the circumstances in
other cases where courts have held that the government defendant had an affirmative duty to act).
271. Compare Arreola v. Cty. of Monterey, 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 38, 53, 55, 57 (Cal. Ct. App.
2002) (holding that a failure to maintain a public improvement project despite a known risk to private property can support a claim of inverse condemnation, and therefore the plaintiffs adequately
pleaded their inverse condemnation claim), and Jordan v. St. Johns Cty., 63 So. 3d 835, 839 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that the failure to act in the face of an affirmative duty to act can
support a claim for inverse condemnation where the County failed to maintain a public road, depriving the claimants of access to their property), and Alger v. Dep’t of Labor & Industry, 917
A.2d 508, 517 (Vt. 2006) (holding that the government defendant had a duty to enforce the housing code), with Litz II, 466 Md. at 258–61, 131 A.3d at 925–27 (discussing the factual circumstances under which the Respondents failed to enforce the installation of a sewage system despite
known damage to Litz’s property).
272. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).
273. Litz II, 466 Md. at 261, 131 A.3d at 927.
274. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015.
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need to demonstrate that the physical invasion was permanent and not temporary, as temporary physical invasions are analyzed under the Penn Central Transportation factors and do not constitute per se takings.275 Additionally, Maryland has not yet addressed the issue of whether sewage
contamination constitutes a physical invasion of the land in the context of
inverse condemnation claims.276 To demonstrate a permanent taking may
require a factual finding that the contamination is permanent in nature, and
potentially that the government will permanently fail to install a public
sewer system. Litz likely will not be able to prove the latter because the
county has begun construction on a public sewer system.277 Additionally,
per se takings generally are rarely found and the standards are applied narrowly.278
If Litz cannot prove her claims fall under a per se takings rule, the
Penn Central factors apply.279 Application of the Penn Central factors is
somewhat unpredictable, as the courts consider the totality of the circumstances and the Supreme Court has failed to provide much detailed guidance.280 Notably, the economic impact under the Penn Central analysis
must generally still be severe, and even a severe economic loss alone will
not constitute a taking.281 Therefore to recover, Litz will likely need to
demonstrate a large percentage of her property value was lost as a result of
the contamination. She must additionally demonstrate that the character of
the government’s inaction would support a takings claim or that she had investment backed expectations that were destroyed by the government’s inaction. Even if Litz argues that she lost not only the value of her property,
but the ability to profitably run her business, she may not succeed because
“profitability has traditionally not been recognized as a protected property
interest under the takings clause.”282 One circumstance in Litz’s favor,
however, is the fact that damage to her property affects her property unique275. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 331
(2002).
276. In Maryland Port Administration v. QC Corporation, the Court of Appeals noted that
while installations such as telephone lines and pipes, as well as the dumping of waste, constituted
a physical invasion, microscopic particles in the ambient air above the claimant’s property were
not a physical invasion. 310 Md. 379, 389–90, 529 A.2d 829, 834 (1987). Therefore, if the contamination is considered the dumping of waste, the court could find a physical invasion; however,
the court could instead determine that the contamination was more similar to the microscopic particles in Maryland Port Administration. At least one other jurisdiction has held that sewage contamination, including odor, is a physical invasion under an inverse condemnation claim. Sundell
v. Town of New London, 409 A.2d 1315, 1319 (N.H. 1979).
277. Kobell, supra note 218.
278. Echeverria, supra note 259, at 173 (2005).
279. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc., 535 U.S. 302, 330 (2002).
280. Echeverria, supra note 259, at 171–72.
281. Id. at 178.
282. Id. at 182.
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ly and to “a high degree,” as required in inverse condemnation cases where
no physical invasion is involved.283
The other two Penn Central factors, Litz’s investment-backed expectations and the character of the government’s action, could also ultimately fall
within Litz’s favor.284 Typically, the investment-backed expectations factor
is analyzed in the context of whether the relevant regulation was enacted
before the claimant purchased the property, the extent of the claimant’s
knowledge of the regulatory action restricting the property if it existed prior
to purchase, and the foreseeability of the regulation if the regulation was not
in place prior to purchase.285 Additionally, the courts consider the reason
the property was purchased.286 Litz’s case in particular is complicated by
the fact that she inherited the property at issue, and the Court has struggled
with the weight that inheritance should hold on the investment-backed expectations factor because the inheritor did not actually invest in the property.287 Based on the facts disclosed by the Court of Appeals, Litz’s parents
originally used the property as a farm and the lake was created for irrigation
purposes.288 Litz apparently planned to depend on the campground business
her parents had developed for income289; however, even if the property was
used as originally intended, the sewage contamination of Lake Bonnie likely would have prevented adequate irrigation.
Finally, the character of the government action in Litz is unusual because the claimant alleges her property was taken due to the Respondents’
inaction rather than a specific act.290 One component of this factor is
whether there was an actual physical invasion of the property.291 Litz could
argue that her property was physically invaded by contaminated water292
and even a temporary physical invasion tends to favor a finding that a taking occurred.293 Additionally, the courts look at whether the act harms the
claimants as individuals disproportionately, or places a burden properly on
the public as a whole.294 In Litz’s case, the failure to develop an apparently
necessary sewage system appears to have caused some harm to the

283. Md. Port Admin v. QC Corp., 310 Md. 379, 391, 529 A.2d 829, 834 (1987).
284. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
285. Echeverria, supra note 259, at 183–84.
286. Id. at 185.
287. Id. at 185–86.
288. Litz v. Md. Dep’t of the Env’t, 446 Md. 254, 258, 131 A.3d 923, 925 (2016).
289. Id. at 258–59, 131 A.3d at 925.
290. Id. at 265, 131 A.3d at 929.
291. Echeverria, supra note 259, at 186–87, 203.
292. See Litz II, 446 Md. at 259–60, 131 A.3d at 925–26 (describing the sewage contamination of Lake Bonnie).
293. Echeverria, supra note 259, at 203.
294. Id. at 204.
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Goldsboro population as a whole.295 Litz has a strong argument though that
the failure disproportionately affected her property alone because the
town’s drainage systems fed into the streams, which terminated at Lake
Bonnie, dumping the contaminated water in the lake.296 Additionally, the
courts look at the advantage of the regulation both to the public as a whole
and to the claimants.297 Here, the failure to develop a sewage system was
beneficial to neither the residents of Goldsboro nor to Litz—to the contrary,
this failure continued a longstanding harm to public health.298 Therefore, in
the event that the court holds the Respondents had an affirmative duty to
enforce the development of a sewage system, Litz has a reasonable chance
of obtaining at least some compensation based on the Penn Central analysis. The standards for takings claims are typically high,299 however, and as
the Court of Appeals pointed out, there is also a reasonable probability that
Litz will not meet these standards.300
The Maryland courts can refine the scope of the holding in Litz
through application. California, for example, also broadly held that inaction
can form the basis of an inverse condemnation claim.301 Following that decision, the court further refined the scope of that holding through application in subsequent cases.302 For example, in Tilton v. Reclamation Dist. No.
800,303 a California court began defining the scope, stating that, “garden variety inadequate maintenance, as distinguished from a faulty plan involving
the design, construction and maintenance of a levee, is not an adequate basis for an inverse condemnation claim.”304 California also held that inaction
can form the basis of an inverse condemnation claim only in the context of
public improvement projects: “to state a cause of action for inverse condemnation, the plaintiff must allege the defendant substantially participated
in the planning, approval, construction, or operation of a public project or

295. See Litz II, 446 Md. at 259–61, 131 A.3d at 925–27 (describing the history and extent of
Goldsboro’s stormwater drainage and sewage contamination problems).
296. Id.
297. Echeverria, supra note 259, at 204.
298. See Litz II, 446 Md. at 259–61, 131 A.3d at 925–27 (describing the history and extent of
Goldsboro’s stormwater drainage and sewage contamination problems).
299. Echeverria, supra note 259, at 178.
300. See Litz II, 446 Md. at 273, 131 A.3d at 934.
301. Arreola v. Cty. of Monterey, 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 38, 55 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002)
302. See, e.g., Tilton v. Reclamation Dist. No. 800, 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 366, 373–74 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2006) (refusing to extend the inverse condemnation doctrine to situations where the government entity merely failed to adequately maintain a public improvement project).
303. 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 366 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
304. Id. at 373–74.
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improvement which proximately caused injury to plaintiff’s property.”305
Maryland can similarly refine the scope of the holding in Litz in the future.
The dissent in Litz is not the first to criticize government inaction as
the basis for inverse condemnation claims. For example, some scholars
have criticized Florida’s holding in Jordan:
The court . . . concluded, without citing authority, “that governmental inaction—in the face of an affirmative duty to act—can
support a claim for inverse condemnation.” . . . Should this extremely troublesome notion gain judicial traction, the implications would be disastrous for government officials whose budgets
would be stretched to the limits (and beyond) by a judicial mandate to absorb the repair costs for damages caused by storms,
floods, drought, unprecedented snowfalls, and other manifestations of climate change.306
These critics were concerned with the increased financial liability that
governments could face for failures to act due to the decision in Jordan.307
Because of the holding, private citizens could potentially recover under an
inverse condemnation claim for a government’s failure to make repairs following damages caused by natural disasters or storms.308 Another article
noted that if courts found that governments have a duty to maintain public
improvement projects such that no damage would result to private property,
local governments would be forced to make the choice between spending
potentially unreasonable amounts of money or facing legal liability.309 The
article noted that the impact of Florida’s cases which held that inaction can
serve as the basis for inverse condemnation will depend on how the courts
decide in future cases on whether the government had an affirmative duty to
act.310 Similarly, the Court of Appeals of Maryland left open the question
of whether the Respondents in Litz actually had an affirmative duty to
act.311 How the courts decide on the issue of whether the Respondents had
305. Wildensten v. E. Bay Reg’l Park Dist, 283 Cal. Rptr. 13, 15 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (citing
Ullery v. Cty. of Contra Costa, 248 Cal. Rptr. 727 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988); Souza v. Silver Dev. Co.,
210 Cal. Rptr 146 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985); Holtz v. Superior Court, 475 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1970) (en
banc); Albers v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 398 P.2d 129 (Cal. 1965) (en banc)).
306. DANIEL R. MANDELKER & MICHAEL ALLAN WOLF, LAND USE LAW § 12.15 (6th ed.
2015).
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Thomas Ruppert & Carly Grimm, Drowning in Place: Local Government Costs and Liabilities for Flooding Due to Sea-Level Rise, 87 FLA. BAR J., at 29, 31–32 (2013).
310. Id. No subsequent Florida cases have cited to Jordan or another Florida case in which
certain government actions and inactions resulted in a finding that the claimant was entitled to just
compensation. Charlotte County v. Rotonda Project, 91 So. 3d 249, 249–50 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2012).
311. Litz v. Md. Dep’t of the Env’t, 446 Md. 254, 273, 131 A.3d 923, 934 (2016).
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an affirmative duty to act will determine whether Litz’s claim individually
can succeed, and can further define whether such affirmative duties exist in
other situations.
The dissenting opinion in Litz, as well as critics of decisions by courts
in other jurisdictions which made similar holdings, argue that holding inaction can serve as the basis for inverse condemnation unreasonably expands
the scope of the claim.312 The holding in Litz, however, is limited to situations in which the government had an affirmative duty to act.313 Courts in
other jurisdictions have similarly limited their holdings, and through subsequent application, further refined the scope of their holdings.314 Therefore,
through application over time, the Maryland courts can also limit the holding in Litz. The facts of the Litz case in fact demonstrate that even given the
decision by the Court of Appeals, Litz still faces a substantial burden on
remand.315 Litz must prove not only that the defendants had an affirmative
duty to act,316 but that her damages fulfill the elements of an inverse condemnation claim. Therefore, the holding in Litz can avoid potential negative consequences, such as vastly increasing the liability of state and local
governments.
V. CONCLUSION
The holding in Litz v. Maryland Dep’t of the Environment is only one
of several state court decisions on the issue of whether inaction by a government entity can serve as the basis for an inverse condemnation claim.317
While various jurisdictions have held differently, the Maryland Court of
Appeals found most persuasive the reasoning that government entities
should be held liable in inverse condemnation for inaction if the government entity had an affirmative duty to act.318 As applied to Litz’s case and
generally, this holding does not contradict any federal or state takings jurisprudence and comports with the policy objectives behind inverse condemnation claims.319 Further, by limiting the cause of action to circumstances
in which an affirmative duty exists, the Court of Appeals provided a mech312. See generally id. at 281–86, 131 A.3d at 939–42 (Watts, J., dissenting); MANDELKER &
WOLF, supra note 306, at § 12.51; Ruppert & Grimm, supra note 309.
313. Litz II, 446 Md. at 267, 131 A.3d at 931.
314. See, e.g., Tilton v. Reclamation Dist. No. 800, 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 366, 373–74 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2006) (clarifying the scope of when inaction can support an inverse condemnation claim).
315. Litz II, 446 Md. at 273; 131 A.3d at 934.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 267, 131 A.3d at 931; see also supra Part II.B (summarizing state court decisions
on whether inaction can serve as the basis for inverse condemnation claims).
318. Litz II, 446 Md at 269, 131 A.3d at 932.
319. See supra Part IV.B (discussing the policy objectives of takings clauses and federal and
state takings jurisprudence).
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anism by which inverse condemnation claims can be further limited by
what duties are determined to be affirmative.320

320. See supra Part IV.C (discussing how courts in other jurisdictions have limited their holdings that inaction can serve as the basis of an inverse condemnation claim and how Maryland may
limit its holding in the future).

